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Abstract
This study aims to analyze audit quality, audit committees, institutional 
ownership and independent director on earnings management at 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2012-2016. The sampling method use purposive sampling for 5 years 
so its obtained 160 observation data samples. The results in this study 
indicate that earnings management that occur is the type of income 
decreasing. Simultaneously audit quality, audit committee, institutional 
ownership and independent directors significantly influence on income 
decreasing. Partially, audit quality and independent director variables 
have a negative effect on income decreasing. While audit committee 
independence has a positive effect on income decreasing. Furthermore, 
audit quality, audit committees, and institutional ownership have no 
effect on earning management type income decreasing.
INTRODUCTION
Manufacture industry is one of rapidly-growing industry in Indonesia. This supported by the fact that 
Indonesia was one of ten major country in manufacturing industry according to International Yearbook of 
Industrial Statistic 2016. Moreover, Indonesian manufacture industry gave high level of contribution to country’s 
economy, compared to other sectors (Figure 1).













Figure 1. Indonesia GDP Contribution by Sector
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (2017) with changes
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Manufacture industry became one of Indonesian industry that attract investor’s interest by showing 
capabilities to generate profit. According to Statement of Financial Accounting Concept (SFAC) No. 1, profit 
information was the main interest to estimate management performance and accountability. Management 
performance appraisal encourages implementation of earning management.
Scott (2011) defined earning management as the choice by a manager of accounting policies so as to achieve 
some specific objective. It means that earning management became manager’s decision to choose certain 
accounting policies, which considered would achieve certain objectives, either increasing profit or reducing 
reported loss. Discretionary accrual became the most common proxy for earning management practices, due 
to tracking difficulty of accounting policy. Implementation of earning management was caused by conflict 
of interest. According to agency theory, conflict of interest happened when the two parties, management and 
owner, would like to only maximizing their own gain and benefit (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Within earning management, there were two concept of accrual transaction, namely discretionary accrual 
and non-discretionary accrual. Scott (2011) described discretionary accrual as a way to decrease hard-to-detect 
profits through manipulating accounting policy connected with accrual. While non-discretionary accrual was 
the recognition of reasonable profit which comply the general accounting principle. Therefore, in case of 
it being violated, the financial statement becomes unfair. Discretionary accrual became common proxy for 
earning management practices, due to tracking difficulty of accounting policy.
Opportunistic manager behavior underlay the birth of earning management concept. Opportunism was 
a view that describe people simply desire to gain as much profit as they can from every chance, unheeding 
commonly accepted principles (Fajri & Senja, 2002). Furthermore, the birth of earning management concept 
also came as the effect of agency problems, namely unaligned interest between managers and firm’s owner due 
to information asymmetry. Information asymmetry was a situation created due to principal not having necessary 
information about agent’s performance, making principal unable to determine the actual result of agent’s 
contribution to the firm (Supriyono, 2000). Scott (2011) stated there were several motives for management to 
implement earning management, namely bonus, debt covenant hypothesis, meet investor earning expectations, 
maintain reputation, and initial public offering (IPO).
As per mentioned motives, earning management scandals would not come as a surprise. In Indonesia, 
there was a case of PT Inovisi Infracom, Tbk (INVS). Earning management practice of INVS happened in 
2015. Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) found at least eight mistakes within INVS’s annual report in III-24 
quarter. IDX requested INVS to revised their value of fixed assets, earning per share, business segment report, 
financial instrument category, and liabilities in business segment information. Previously, INVS’s management 
had revised their annual report for January – September 2014 period. One example is the decreasing value 
of fixed assets to Rp1.16 trillion. INVS also acknowledged earning per share based on current year earning, 
making it seems higher. Even though the firm should use current period earnings distributed to parent entity 
(detikFinance, 2017).
Similar case involving earning management practice were also found in one of Japan’s leading electronic 
company, Toshiba, in 2015. Hisao Tanaka, CEO of Toshiba Corp., along with several senior officers resigned 
themselves after being involved in the biggest accounting scandal in Japan within the last few years. Tanaka 
found to be manipulating his company’s earning, reaching almost ¥ 151.8billion or approximately US$ 
1.22million, during the last few years. Tanaka’s predecessor and the Vice-Director, Norio Sasaki, and the 
advisor Atsutoshi Nishida, also resigned themselves after independent team had shown their involvement in 
the earning scandal for fiscal year 2008 (Hakim, 2015).
Good Corporate Governance (GCG) recently became a hot topic for public, stakeholders, government, and 
management in increasing transparency. As mentioned by Sulistyanto (2008), GSG was a system that organizes 
and controls a firm so that it would create added value for all of its’ stakeholders. In order to prevent earning 
management practices, Indonesian government, through Bapepam, published GCG system with the purpose 
of increasing transparency and consistency in economic policy, and also encourage the implementation of 
good industrial governance. 
GCG mechanism used in this research was audit quality, audit committee, institutional ownership, and 
independent director. Audit quality defined as combined probability to detect and report material mistakes in 
financial report (Christiani & Nugrahanti, 2014). Audit quality could be proxied by public accounting firm (KAP) 
measurement, KAP tenure, and tenure auditor. Audit quality given by public accountant could be measured 
through the size of auditing KAP. Major KAP (The Big 4) would be considered giving better quality audit, 
due to resource capability compared to smaller firms. Research by Alzoubi (2016) showed that the practice of 
earning management would be significantly lower in firms using The Big 4 audit service, compared to other 
firms that did not.
44 Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Kontemporer
Volume 13, No. 1, April 2021, Page. 42-50
Yanthi, et. al
Meanwhile, audit tenure was the time of service of auditor working in KAP that gave audit service to 
its client (Al-Thuneibat, et. al., 2011). This engagement period controls the tenure between KAP and client, 
and tenure between auditor and client. The relationship duration between auditor and client had potency to 
develop economic bond. Thus, auditor could give its approval upon the usage of accounting manipulation 
by the client in the financial statement (Chi, et. al., 2011). In Indonesia, Financial Service and Exchange 
Monitoring Agency (BAPEPAM) had released the Act of Accountant Independency in Giving Service to 
Exchange (Keputusan BAPEPAM-LK No. 310 2008), that limits audit tenure of financial statement by KAP 
in maximum six continuous years, and by Public Accountant in maximum three continuous years. Voluntary 
partner rotation within KAP frequently suggested by professional accounting agency as a compromise to 
reduce auditor independency (IESBA, 2009).
Audit committee was one of the committees working professionally and independently, appointed by board 
of commissioner, to help and strengthen board of commissioner’s supervising function (Widyati, 2013). Audit 
committee in this research was projected through audit committee’s independency, and financial expertise. 
The following formula was used to test audit committee’s independency:
While to count the level of expertise of audit committee, following formula was used:
ACINDP =
Count of external members
×100%
Total members of Audit Committee
ACCOMP =
Count of financial expert members
×100%
Total members of Audit Committee
Mahariana and Ramantha (2014) described institutional ownership as the ownership of a firm’s stock 
by another institution (assurance company, bank, investment company, etc.). The existance of institutional 
ownership presumed to gave supervising mechanism to various interest within a firm. Institutional ownership 
structure was the percentage of stock owned by institution divided with number of share outstanding, or 




Number of share outstanding
Independent director refers to member(s) of board of directors which absent from material relationship 
with the firm, directly or indirectly as a partner, share owner, or an employee of partnering firm (Arjoon, 2005). 
Independent director had the ability to manage pressure from the firm to manipulate earnings, and more capable 
to monitor earning process. In this research, independent director would be calculated as follows:
INDPDIREC =
Number of independent director
×100%
Total members of board of director
Audit quality was one of the most important criteria in determining the quality of financial statements. Good 
financial statements were capable to describe real condition of the firm and minimize information asymmetry. 
Audit conducted by The Big 4 auditors had better expertise and reputation compared to other auditors. Thus, 
auditor(s) from The Big 4, should seriously maintain their market share, public trust, and their reputation by 
giving protection to the public (Sanjaya, 2008). Previous Research by Alzoubi (2016) had shown that the practice 
of earning management would be significantly lower in firms using The Big 4 audit service, compared to other 
firms that did not. The result was also supported by Inaam and Khamoussi (2016), whom stated that KAP 
size negatively influencing earning management practice. On the other hand, Agustia (2013) and Christani & 
Nugrahanti (2014) found other result that KAP size did not have significant influence to earning management. 
Aside from KAP size, audit quality could also be observed through audit tenure. Tenure refers to time span 
of auditor assignment to clients that heed government’s regulation (Chi, et. al., 2011; Nihlati & Meiranto, 2014). 
The longer the time span, the higher auditor’s knowledge of the firm (Giri, 2010). Thus, long assignment time 
gave auditor the convenience to discover earning management within the firm. Previous research by Fatmawati 
(2013) found empirical result that audit tenure positively influencing discretionary accrual. It confirmed that the 
longer the assignment time, the higher level of earning management practice, which lowers auditor’s independency. 
Subsequently, research by Kurniawansyah (2016) also support the discovery. However, research by Kono and 
Yuyetta (2013) pointed out the inexistence of relationship between audit tenure with earning management. 
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One of good corporate governance (GCG) characteristic was the existence of audit committee. Audit 
committee must use their independency and competency in performing their activities according to regulator. 
Agoes (2012) described independency as rigorous for persuasion, because auditor conducts their job for public 
interest. Aside from being the frontline of corporate governance in financial statements (Trautman, 2013), the 
inherent function of audit committee means that the committee members demanded to possess supervising, 
accounting, and financing competency. Prior research by Alzoutbi & Selamat (2012) discovered that firms 
with audit committee possessing independency and financial expertise did not engage in earning management 
practice. Kusumaningtyas (2012) also supported the notion by discovering that audit committee’s independency 
was negatively influencing earning management, proxied by discretionary accrual. As for audit committee’s 
financial expertise, empirical research by Chen and Zhang (2012) and Fairuzza (2014) support the notion that 
it was negatively influencing earning management practice, while Prastiti and Meiranto (2013) discovered the 
inexistence of relationship between them.
Institutional ownership was the proportion of firm’s share owned by institution by the end of fiscal year 
(Nabela, 2012). The existence of institutional investor presumed to brought effective monitoring mechanism in 
managerial decision making. Prior research by Utari and Sari (2016) and Alzoubi (2016) found that institutional 
ownership was negatively influencing earning management. While still, the possibility of relationship inexistence 
between the two variables remains (Maharina and Ramantha, 2014; Anggani and Nazzar, 2015).
Independent director refers to member(s) of board of directors which absent from material relationship 
with the firm, directly or indirectly as a partner, share owner, or an employee of partnering firm (Arjoon, 2005). 
Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2014 released regulation about Stock Listing and Equity Securities other than 
Shares Published by Listed Company (SK Direksi BEI No. 1 2014). It had been regulating that candidate 
of listed company must have at least one independent director. Prior empirical research by Chen and Zhang 
(2012) and Uadiale (2012) found that board of directors with majority being independent directors negatively 
influencing earning management practice withing firm. While on the other hand, Al-Thuneibat, et al. (2016) 
found the inexistence of relationship between the two variables during empirical study in Saudi Arabia. Table 
1 described the details of variable operationalization of each variable.
Table 1. Variable Operationalization
Variable Variable Concept Indicator(s) Scale
Audit 
Quality (X1)
1. Big Four Auditor are auditors with 
expertise and reputation exceeding 
other Non-Big Four auditors. 
Thus, The Big Four KAP have 
higher quality to prevent earning 
management from public perspective 
(Sanjaya, 2008)
2. Longer engagement period 
between audit personnel or KAP with 
the client could create concern over 
personal closeness and interest which 
interferes auditor’s independency 
(IESBA, 2009).
1. Dummy variable (categorical or dichotomy variable). Code 0 
was given to excluded group (non-big four firms) and code 1 was 
given to included group (big four)
2. Measured by calculating the number of years it tooks for KAP 
and its auditor to audit financial report of a firm consecutively 






1. The more independent audit 
committee would give better 
supervision to management in 
composing financial statements 
(Beasley, 1996)
2. Indicator(s) used to measure 
success of audit committee with 
financial expertise to supervise 
management in creating good 
financial statements and reducing 
earning management practice 
(Sulistyanto, 2008)
ACINDP =
Count of external members
×100%
Total members of Audit Committee
ACCOMP =
Count of financial expert members
×100%
Total members of Audit Committee
Rasio
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METHOD
The population of this research was manufacture companies listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) 
in 2012-2016. Purposive sampling technique (Sugiyono, 2014) were used with several criteria, such as: (1)
Manufacture company listed in IDX during 2012-2016; (2) Manufacture company whom published their annual 
report consistently during observation period of 2012-2016; (3) Manufacture company whom published their 
audited annual report during observation period of 2012-2016; (4) Manufacture company whom used Rupiah 
currency in their annual report during 2012-2016; (5) Manufacture company whom had complete data regarding 
earning management during 2012-2016. Based on mentioned criteria, 160 sample units from 32 sample firms 
were obtained on the course of 2012-2016. Analysis technique used in this research was descriptive analysis 
and data panel regression, with following equation.
RESULT




Institutional ownership is the 
proportion of firm owned by institution 
investor(s), measured by the percentage 
of share owned by institutional investor 
divided with total share outstanding 









Independent director(s) could supervise 
effectively, in maintaining and 
developing reputation as independent 
director and to give market signal that 
they act in shareholder’s interest (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983)
McMeeking, et. al., (2006) also 
found that the higher proportion 
of independent director would 
minimize abnormal accrual revenue 
acknowledgement.
INDPDIREC =
Number of independent director
×100%





E a r n i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  i s 
management’s decision to determine 
accounting policy which are able 
to obtain desired outcome, whether 
increasing earning or reducing 
reported loss (Scott, 2011)
DAit = TAit / Ait-1 – NDAit Rasio
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Result
EM KAPSIZE KAPTENURE AUDTENURE ACINDP ACCOMP INSTOWN INDPDIREC
Mean -2.45E+08 0.400000 2.643750 1.462500 0.980250 0.837404 0.682479 0.189051
Median -29255415 0.000000 2.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 0.688600 0.166700
Maximum 9.86E+09 1.000000 5.000000 4.000000 1.000000 1.000000 0.977300 0.833300
Minimum -1.18E+10 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000 0.670000 0.000000 0.209600 0.000000
Std. Dev. 1.60E+09 0.491436 1.397873 0.717153 0.070058 0.214345 0.183527 0.195259
Skewness -1.072750 0.408248 0.305550 1.414742 -3.314655 -1.212718 -0.360018 1.051586
Kurtosis 29.41076 1.166667 1.797307 4.180338 12.25823 4.462160 2.533970 3.918324
Jarque-Bera 4680.877 26.85185 12.13274 62.66120 864.4177 53.47101 4.904237 35.11103
Probability 0.000000 0.000001 0.002320 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.086111 0.000000
Sum -3.91+10 64.00000 423.0000 234.0000 156.8400 133.9847 109.1966 30.24810
Sum Sq. Dev. 4.09E+20 38.40000 310.6937 81.77500 0.780390 7.305059 5.355445 6.062022
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
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From the data panel test, common effect was chosen as the method. Constant value amounted to -2,050,000,000 
described that if audit quality (KAPSIZE, KAPTENURE, AUDITORTENURE), audit committee, (ACINDP 
and ACCOMP), institutional ownership (INSTOWN), and independent director (INDPDIRECT) as variables 
were to amounted 0 or constant, then the value of earning management practice (EM) would be -2,050,000,000. 
Negative value of constants indicating income decreasing pattern of earning management.
From data panel regression result (Table 3), indicating that audit quality, audit committee, institutional 
ownership, and independent director were able to describe of influence the value EM in the amount of 12.99%. 
The value of prob (F-statistic) in the amount of 0.000183.
Table 3. Weighted Fixed Effect Test Results
Dependent Variable: EM
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)




Total Panel (Balanced) observations: 160
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -2.05E+09 7.30E+08 -2.803095 0.0057
KAPSIZE -2.39E+08 71338265 -3.354057 0.0010
KAPTENURE -34282952 21531952 -1.592190 0.1134
AUDTENURE -2247657 40415609 -0.055614 0.9557
ACINDP 1.98E+09 7.27E+08 2.716232 0.0074
ACCOMP 1.07E+08 1.21E+08 0.887632 0.3761
INSTOWN 1.83E+08 1.51E+08 1.206805 0.2294
INDPDIREC -3.69E+08 1.38E+08 -2.666484 0.0085
Weighted Statistics
R-squared 0.168166 Mean dependent var -3.60E+08
Adj. R-squared 0.129858 S.D. dependent var 1.19E+09
S.E. of regression 1.14E+09 Sum squared resid 1.97E+20
F-statistic 4.389816 Durbin-Watson Stat 1.641093
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000183
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.043199 Mean dependent var -2.45E+08
Sum squared resid 3.91E+20 Durbin-Watson stat 1.828996
DISCUSSION
Audit quality variable, proxied by KAP size, has p-value amounted to 0.0010 and regression coefficient valued 
at -239,000,000, which means audit quality is partially influencing income decreasing earning management. 
Regression coefficient in amount of -239,000,000 shows the positive relationship between KAP size to earning 
management practice with income decreasing pattern. Thus, the conclusion arrived at the size of KAP positively 
influence the level of earning management practice with income decreasing pattern in manufacture firms listed 
in IDX during 2012-2016. The result presumably caused by the majority of sample firms using the service of 
The Big Four KAP.
Audit quality variable, proxied by KAP tenure, has p-value of 0.1134 and regression coefficient of -34,282,952. 
It means that audit quality, proxied by KAP tenure, partially not influencing earning management with income 
decreasing pattern in manufacture firms listed in IDX during 2012-2016. Presumably, the inexistence of 
relationship was caused by the usage of KAP tenure only as a means to comply with the regulation.
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Audit quality variable, proxied by auditor tenure, has p-value of 0.9557 and regression coefficient of 
-2.247.657. It means that audit quality, proxied by audit tenure, partially not influencing earning management 
with income decreasing pattern in manufacture firms listed in IDX during 2012-2016. Presumably, the inexistence 
of relationship was caused by the usage of audit tenure only as a means to comply with the regulation.
Audit committee variable, proxied by independency, has p-value of 0.0074 and regression coefficient of 
1,980,000,000. It means that audit committee variable proxied by independency partially influencing income 
decreasing EM practice in manufacture firms listed in IDX during 2012-2016. The result aligned with agency 
theory whom stated independent audit committee would give effective supervision to management. The more 
independent the committee is, the more effective the supervision. Kusumaningtyas (2012) argued that the more 
indepent the committee member, then the quality of financial statements would become more trusted. Thus, 
independency of audit committee could minimize the EM practice in the firm
Audit committee variable, proxied by expertise, has p-value of 0.3761 and regression coefficient of 
107,000,000. It means that audit committee variable proxied by expertise partially does not influence income 
decreasing EM practice in manufacture firms listed in IDX during 2012-2016. Presumably, the result caused 
by the existence of audit committee member(s) with financial expertise only act as compliance to regulation, 
without proper execution of their function (Dwiharyadi, 2017).
Institutional ownership variable has p-value of 0.2294 and regression coefficient of 183,000,000. It 
means that institutional ownership variable partially does not influence income decreasing EM practice in 
manufacture firms listed in IDX during 2012-2016. It is presumed to be caused by information asymmetry 
between management and institutional owner(s), leading to ineffective implementation of supervision function.
Independent director variable has p-value of 0.0085 and regression coefficient of -369,000,000. It means 
that independent director variable partially influences income decreasing EM practice in manufacture firms 
listed in IDX during 2012-2016. Regression coefficient of -369,000,000 shows positive relationship between 
independent director variable to income decreasing EM practices, meaning that the existence of independent 
director would cause increasing EM practices. Presumably, the result could be caused by several reasons. 
First, regulation regarding the compulsion of independent director presence in firm’s board of directors was 
just recently implemented. Furthermore, the independent directors were still transitioning and adjusting their 
duty and function as supervisory agent, they require certain time to fully understand the firm’s condition. 
Additionally, the low ratio of independent directors in 2012-2016 presumed to caused ineffective and inefficient 
supervisory function, which ultimately leads to inability to suppress EM practices.
The government is trying to improve the quality and quantity of services by providing a solution in the 
form of SIMP3AK. SIMP3AK in government agencies has an important role to be able to present quality 
reports. Tuser subjectivity assessment whether they will use the system sustainably or not (Li & Shang, 2020).
CONCLUSIONS
Simultaneously, audit quality, audit committee, institutional ownership, and independent director show 
significant influence over earning management with income decreasing pattern. KAP tenure, auditor tenure, audit 
committee expertise, and institutional ownership do not have significant influence over earning management 
with income decreasing pattern. KAP size and independent director have significant positive relationship over 
earning management with income decreasing pattern. Audit committee independency has significant negative 
relationship over earning management with income decreasing pattern. 
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